This paper is devoted to the study of two-person zero-sum games for continuous-time jump Markov processes with a discounted payoff criterion. The state and action spaces are all Polish spaces, the transition rates are allowed to be unbounded, and the payoff rates may have neither upper nor lower bounds. We give conditions on the game's primitive data under which the existence of a solution to the Shapley equation is ensured. Then, from the Shapley equation, we obtain the existence of the value of the game and of a pair of optimal stationary strategies using the extended infinitesimal operator associated with the transition function of a possibly nonhomogeneous continuous-time jump Markov process. We also provide a recursive way of computing (or at least approximating) the value of the game. Moreover, we present a 'martingale characterization' of a pair of optimal stationary strategies. Finally, we apply our results to a controlled birth and death system and a Schlögl first model, and then we use controlled Potlach processes to illustrate our conditions.
Introduction
In this paper we are concerned with a class of zero-sum stochastic dynamic games. These games have been widely studied in the literature. The existing works can be roughly classified into three main groups. The first group deals with discrete-time games (see, for instance, [6] , [15] , [23] , [26] , [28] , and the references therein), in which the evolution of the states of the game is described by a discrete-time Markov chain. The second group deals with stochastic differential games (see, for instance, [2] , [7] , [17] , and the references therein), in which the states evolve according to a stochastic differential equation. The third group deals with semi-Markov games in which the state of the game is described by a semi-Markov process and the players can choose their actions only at certain (random) epochs; see, for instance, [16] , [19] , [22] , [29] , and the references therein. Here we study a fourth class of stochastic games, namely, continuoustime Markov games in which the state process evolves according to a continuous-time jump Markov process. The latter class has been considered in [12] , [13] , and [18] . However, the Finally, r(x, a, b) is a real-valued function on K that stands for the reward rate function for player 1 (or the cost rate function for player 2).
The game is played as follows. Players 1 and 2 continuously observe the current state of the system. Whenever the system is at state x(t) ∈ S at time t ≥ 0, players 1 and 2 independently choose actions a t ∈ A(x(t)) and b t ∈ B(x(t)) according to some strategies, respectively. As a consequence of this, the following happens: 
otherwise ,
, where e i is the element in S whose value corresponding to i is 1, and all other values are 0. Here we interpret the parameters (β 0 , β 1 ) and (δ 1 , δ 2 ) as the actions controlled by players 1 and 2, which take values in compact sets A and B in R 2 + , respectively, where R + := (0, ∞). Moreover, when using actions a and b in state x ∈ S, player 1 receives a reward r 1 (x, a) and player 2 obtains a reward r 2 (x, b), so that the payoff for this model turns out to be r(x, a, b) := r 1 (x, a) − r 2 (x, b).
The other part of the model consists of diffusion between any two vessels, which are described by a transition probability matrix (p(i, j ) : i, j ∈ E). This means that, if there are x i particles in vessel i, then the rate function of the diffusion from vessel i to j is x i p(i, j ). Thus, the rate function of the diffusion becomes 5) and
The two examples will be further studied in Section 6, below. 
Strategies
A randomized Markov strategy for player 1 is a family π 1 = (π 1 t ) (t ≥ 0) that satisfies the following conditions.
is a Borel function on S, and for each x ∈ S, π 1 t (· | x) is a probability measure on A, and, furthermore,
For each t ≥ 0 and x ∈ S, by (i), we shall regard π 1 t (· | x) as a probability measure on A(x). We denote by m 1 the family of all randomized Markov strategies for player 1. A strategy π 1 = (π 1 t ) ∈ m 1 is called stationary if it does not depend on t; that is, if there is a stochastic kernel π 1 on A given S such that
for all x ∈ S and t ≥ 0.
We denote this stationary strategy by 
we define the associated transition rates q(· | x, π 1 t , π 2 t ) as follows. For each C ∈ B(S), x ∈ S, and t ≥ 0,
In particular, when both π 1 and π 2 are stationary, we write the left-hand side of (3.1) as q(C | x, π 1 , π 2 ). It follows that, for each fixed pair of strategies
is an infinitesimal generator [5] . (For a more precise statement of this fact, see Lemma 7.2(b) with u = 1 C , the indicator function of a set C, and Remark 7.1, below.) As is well known, any (possibly substochastic and nonhomogeneous) transition (probability) functionp(s, x, t, C; π 1 , π 2 ) depending on (π 1 , π 2 ) and satisfying
for all x ∈ S, C ∈ B(S), and t ≥ 0, is called a Q-process with transition rates q(C | x, π 1 t , π 2 t ). To guarantee the existence of such a Q-process we restrict ourselves to admissible policies in the classes 1 and 2 defined as follows. Lemma 3.1(b) guarantees the existence of a Q-process, such as the minimum Q-process denoted by p min (s, x, t, C; π 1 , π 2 ), which it is so-named because p min (s, x, t, C; π 1 , π 2 ) ≤ p(s, x, t, C; π 1 , π 2 ) for any Q-processp(s, x, t, C; π 1 , π 2 ). The minimum Q-process can be directly constructed from the given transition rates q(· | x, π 1 t , π 2 t ); see (3.3), below. As is well known [1] , [5] , however, such a Q-process might not be regular, that is, we might have p min (s, x, t, S; π 1 , π 2 ) < 1 for some x ∈ S and t ≥ s ≥ 0. To ensure the regularity of a Q-process we propose the following 'drift' conditions. [20] , for a homogeneous Q-process, and it is also known as a Lyapunov or Foster-Lyapunov condition. It is typically used to obtain growth conditions, as in Lemma 3.2(a), below, or some forms of ergodicity, as in [11] , [16] , and [29] , for instance. Assumption 3.1 is supposed to hold throughout the following, unless explicitly stated otherwise.
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Proof. (a) Part (a) can be obtained as in the proof of Lemma 3.2 of [11] .
which together with (3. To define our game's payoff criterion, we need to introduce the state and action processes for players 1 and 2. Thus, we first construct a probability space for these processes.
For each s ≥ 0, let
be the corresponding regular Q-process. Let E := S × A × B with the usual product σ -algebra.
For each s ≥ 0, let µ s be an arbitrary probability distribution on S. Then, for each vector
we can define the product probability measure P
Let T := [0, ∞), and let ( , F ) be the (canonical) product measurable space with := E T , and F the product σ -algebra. Moreover, let g τ be the coordinate projection, i.e. 
where
Proof. Because any probability measure on a Polish space is 'inner regular' [25] , by (3.4) we conclude that the probability measure P
is also inner regular for each τ ∈ G s . Then the existence of the unique probability measureP 
Definition 3.2. (State and action processes.)
For each e = (e(t), t ≥ 0) ∈ and t ≥ 0, let e(t) := (e 0 (t), e 1 (t), e 2 (t)) ∈ E = S × A × B. Then the coordinate process ξ(t)(e) := e 0 (t) defines the system's state process, and η 1 (t)(e) := e 1 (t) and η 2 (t)(e) := e 2 (t) are the action processes for players 1 and 2, respectively. 
which is Borel measurable in (t, x), because p(s, x, t, C; π 1 , π 2 ) is continuous in t ≥ 0; see [5] . Hence, (c) follows.
We will write the left-hand side of (3.8) as r(x, π 1 , π 2 ) when both π 1 and π 2 are stationary.
The discounted payoff criterion
F ix a discount factor α > 0. Then, for each pair of strategies (π 1 , π 2 ) ∈ 1 × 2 and x ∈ S, the discounted payoff criterion J (·, ·, ·) is defined as
We also need the following concepts. The functions on S defined as
are called the lower value and the upper value, respectively, of the discounted payoff game. It is clear that
When the equality holds in (4.2) we obtain the following definitions from the theory of dynamic games [2] , [6] , [7] , [12] , [13] , [15] , [16] , [19] , [22] , [26] , [28] .
for all x ∈ S, then the common function is called the value of the game and denoted by V .
Definition 4.2.
Suppose that the game has a value V . Then a strategy π 1 * in 1 is said to be optimal for player 1 if
Similarly, π 2 * ∈ 2 is optimal for player 2 if
If π k * ∈ k is optimal for player k (k = 1, 2), then (π 1 * , π 2 * ) is called a pair of optimal strategies. The aim of this paper is to give conditions for the existence of pairs of optimal stationary strategies, and to present a 'martingale characterization' of such pairs. To this end we first introduce some notation.
For each s ≥ 0, x ∈ X, and each pair of strategies (π 1 , π 
and so, by (4.3) and (4.1),
Remark 4.1. By (4.4), without loss of generality we will restrict ourselves to using x(t) and the corresponding probability P
and expectation E
throughout the following.
Main results
In this section we state our main results. The proofs are postponed to Section 7. To guarantee the finiteness of the discounted criterion J (x, π 1 , π 2 ), by Lemma 3.2(a) and (4.4) it is natural to propose the following conditions, in which w 1 is the function in Assumption 3.1. Conversely, to ensure the existence of a pair of optimal strategies, in addition to Assumptions 3.1 and 5.1, we use the following hypotheses. 
Remark 5.1. Assumptions 5.2(a)-(c) are similar to the standard continuity-compactness hypotheses for discrete-time Markov control processes; see, for instance, [14] , [24] , and the references therein. Assumption 5.2(d) allows us to use Dynkin's formula, but it can be removed when q(x) is bounded on S.
Given a measurable function w on S with w(x) ≥ 1 for all x ∈ S, a function u on S is called w-bounded if the w-norm u w defined as
is finite. Such a function w will be referred to as a weight function. We denote by B w (S) the Banach space of all w-bounded measurable functions on S.
Moreover, for any C ∈ B(S), and probability measures φ ∈ P(A(x)) and ψ ∈ P(B(x)), let
For each
Let q(x) be as defined in (2.2), and take an arbitrary real-valued measurable function m(x) on S such that m(x) > q(x) ≥ 0 for all x ∈ S.
Moreover, let w 1 be as in Assumption 3.1, and define an operator T on B w 1 (S) as follows: for u ∈ B w 1 (S) and x ∈ S,
where the probability measure P(· | x, φ, ψ) is defined as
Moreover, for each n ≥ 1 and x ∈ S, let 
r(x, φ, π Theorem 5.1 is a key result: part (d) gives the existence of the value of the game, whereas (b) provides a recursive way of computing (or at least approximating) the value of the game. Moreover, Theorem 5.1(e) shows the existence of a pair of optimal stationary strategies. Next, we give an interesting characterization of a pair of optimal stationary strategies.
Under the hypotheses of Theorem 5.1, for each x ∈ S, φ ∈ P(A(x)), and ψ ∈ P(B(x)) let
where V (x) is the value of the game; see Theorem 5.1(d). Moreover, for each
and define the (continuous-time) stochastic process by 
submartingale, and
Proof. See Section 7.
Theorem 5.2 gives, in particular, a 'martingale characterization'of a pair of optimal stationary strategies. Theorems 5.1 and 5.2 are extensions of the results in [9] and [10] for control problems (or one-player games).
Examples
In this section we first apply our results to the controlled queueing system in Example 2.1 and to the controlled Schlögl model in Example 2.2, and then introduce Examples 6.3 and 6.4 to illustrate our assumptions. 
Under these conditions we obtain the following result. Proof. We shall first verify Assumption 3.1. Let w 1 (x) := x + 1 for all x ∈ S, and M q := µ + λ + h 1 + h 2 . Then Assumption 3.1(b) follows from (2.3). Also, for each x ∈ S, a ∈ A(x), and b ∈ B(x), from E 1 and (2.3) we have, for x ≥ 1,
(6.1)
By inequalities (6.1) and (6.2) we see that Assumption 3.1(a) holds with c 1 := λ − µ and b 1 := M q , and so Assumption 3.1 follows. Furthermore, by (2.4) and E 3 , we have
for all x ∈ S, which together with E 1 gives Assumption 5.1. 
Then as in (6.1) 
for all a ∈ A, b ∈ B, and x ∈ S. 
Thus, for any x ∈ S such that x i ≥ 1 with i ∈ E, a ∈ A, and b ∈ B,
are fixed constants, and λ k i are independent of a, b, and x. Since there exists a positive integer L * such that −2δ 2 x 3 i + λ 1 x 2 i + λ 2 x i + λ 3 < 0 when x i ≥ L * , and the set {x ∈ S : x i ≤ L * for some i ∈ E} is finite, straightforward calculations yield a constant b 1 > 0 such that
Conversely, by (2.5) we have
which together with (6.4) gives Assumption 3.1. 
whereas the reward rate is given by
Then by (6.7) we have 9) and so (2.2) holds. Moreover, by (6.5)-(6.7) we have
which together with (6. 10) with Tr(a 1 ) denoting the trace of a (transition) matrix a 1 , and 
Proof of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2
In this section we present the proof of Theorems 5.1 and 5.2. To do so, we first introduce some results which are already known but we state them here for completeness and ease of reference. 
is also continuous in φ ∈ P(A(x)).
Proof. (a) By Assumptions 5.2(b) and 5.2(c) we see that r(x, φ, ψ) and P(C | x, φ, ψ), for each C ∈ B(S), are continuous. Then, the desired conclusion follows from Lemma 8.3.7 of [14] and Assumption 5.2(c).
(b) By Assumption 5.2(a), P(B(x)) is compact. Thus, g * (φ) is well defined for each φ ∈ P(A(x)). Similarly, by Assumption 5.2(a) we also have P(A(x)) is compact. Hence, g(φ, ψ) is uniformly continuous on the compact metric space P(A(x))×P(B(x)), and so part (b) follows from well-known facts. (a) For each u ∈ B w 1 +w 2 (S) and t ≥ v ≥ s,
for all y ∈ S.
for all t ≥ s. 
which together with v := s and noting that |u(x)| ≤ w(x) u w gives (a)(i).
This inequality and (7.1) give = 0.
This implies (a)(ii). 
